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THE EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN 
AGRICULTURE MOVEMENT, 1977-1979 
WILLIAM P. BROWNE AND JOHN DINSE 
Beginning in late 1977, the media, television 
in particular, portrayed as a unique cultural 
phenomenon an emerging American Agricul-
ture Movement (AAM), a pending farm strike, 
and a depressed farm economy that had 
caused this mobilization. Much was indeed 
unique, especially to the individual farmers 
and the specific manner in which they were 
attempting to apply political pressures, but the 
American Agriculture Movement itself was 
similar to other organizational attempts that 
have taken place in rural America. 
In the following paper we chronicle the 
emergence of the American Agriculture 
Movement as a distinct entity, identify the 
common features in the emergence of new 
farm organizations, and examine the condi-
tions of modern society and technology that 
affect group formation. 
William P. Browne is professor of political science 
at Central Michigan University. He has published 
many articles on farm organizations and group 
activism. John Dinse is associate professor of 
political science at Central Michigan University. 
[GPQ 5 (Fall 1985): 221-235.] 
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AN ORGANIZATION DEVELOPS 
Despite impressions left from journal and 
media accounts that portrayed a grass roots 
insurgency, the emergence of AAM must be 
seen in terms of an active leadership directing 
organizing efforts to a relatively inactive con-
stituency.l These leaders encouraged activism 
through a concerted strategy of mobilization 
with an emphasis on the national issue of a 
farm strike, the reintroduction of a traditional 
farm movement ideology, and the skillful use 
of public relations. 2 
AAM began in mid-summer· 1977 in 
Campo, Colorado, as an outgrowth of those 
enduring cafe conversations typical in all farm 
communities. However, Bud Bitner, George 
Bitner, Alvin Jenkins, Darrel Schroeder, Gene 
Schroeder, Van Stafford, and a few regular 
listeners talked mostly about a new political 
spokesman for farm interests during this 
particular summer.3 They saw a gloomy farm 
economy beset by both low prices and high 
costs, by an unresponsive government, and by 
an array of farm interest groups who were out 
of touch with real farm needs. Their immedi-
ate reaction to the 1977 Farm Bill, a piece of 
legislation that confirmed incentives for large-
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scale production without high supports, inten-
sified their frustrations about each of these 
conditions and precipitated a decision to 
protest. Encouraged by the reception their 
ideas found in their own community, these 
locally respected larger-scale farmers and farm-
related businessmen proceeded to develop an 
organization based on rallies and protests 
against the political system.4 
They would prompt and assist farmers 
throughout the country to organize as local 
groups, much along the lines of Farm Bureau 
county chapters, but without Bureau-related 
emphasis on nonpolitical services. AAM locals 
would be pockets of farmer interaction and 
discussion that would inspire political activism 
instead of emphasizing individual income.S 
The local organizations would Jom in 
statewide and, finally, national demonstra-
tions of movement support. Farmers, the 
initial organizers believed, were widely con-
cerned about their weakened economic status 
but politically lethargic because they lacked 
inspired leadership. 
To organize and inspire, the six instigators 
called a meeting of local farmers for 6 Septem-
ber 1977. They were to form the core for an 
ever broadening series of similar gatherings. 
Approximately 140 residents attended that 
first rally and were presented the already 
constructed outline for a national farm strike 
of all food and fiber producers. This strike was 
to boycott the sale of all farm commodities 
until federal law backtracked from the last two 
omnibus farm bills and guaranteed one hun-
dred percent parity in prices. The participants, 
who now had enthusiastic leaders along with a 
strategy and a goal, then were asked to provide 
the manpower to stage a larger meeting in the 
county seat at Springfield to draw up strike 
plans. For this they were allowed only one 
week in order to reinforce the urgency of 
economic conditions and to create organizatio-
nal momentum for the American Agricultural 
Strike, as the group was called at first. 
The massive use of flyers, personal calls to 
potentially sympathetic friends, and appeals 
for media coverage brought out an estimated 
seven hundred farmers in Springfield. All 
areas of Colorado and neighboring states, 
primarily Kansas and Texas, were represented 
at the meeting. Participants were asked to 
observe how quickly a large and supportive 
turnout could be gathered. This demon-
strated, the speakers argued, that farmers were 
angry enough, smart enough, and committed 
enough to matter politically. The Campo 
leaders then gained acceptance of a 14 Decem-
ber target date for withholding to begin. In 
addition, the leadership gained approval-as 
well as money and volunteer staff assistance-
for establishing a national farm strike head-
quarters in Springfield. Approximately two 
thousand protestors from both east and west 
coasts, along with U.S. Secretary of Agricul-
ture Bob Bergland, turned up for national 
television network coverage of the next rally, 
in Pueblo, Colorado, two weeks later.6 
The strike movement took two distinct 
organizational directions, one decentralized 
and the other centralized. The nationwide 
system of locals was modeled on the successful 
Campo/Springfield rallies. The original orga-
nizers encouraged local pockets of activism 
where strike enthusiasm and peer pressure 
could encourage turnout. With limited re-
sources gathered from participants and from 
sympathetic bankers and business people and 
with a three month deadline, AAM hit the 
roadways and airways. Volunteers at head-
quarters, who were usually the original found-
ers, identified supportive acquaintances and 
set up meetings and rallies in as many states as 
possible. In other states, organizers went in 
blind and used local media coverage to encour-
age attendance. 
By October, AAM strategy was to establish 
local offices, protests, and rallies, and to 
develop state organizations from the helter 
skelter of locals. The organizers communicated 
continuously with the locals as it became 
apparent that energetic supporters looked 
beyond themselves for direction, information, 
and motivation. As communications vehicles, 
the state organizations were seen as newly vital 
cogs in the plan. The state organizations also 
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worked to establish locals. For example, cash-
crop farmers in central Michigan coordinated 
state level operations and traveled north to 
dairy country, east to the state's richest 
croplands, and west to the fruit and vegetable 
producing regions. While neither headquarters 
nor state efforts always paid off in new locals, 
there were high rates of success. Within three 
and one-half months of the Springfield meet-
ing, AAM, according to its leaders, had 
opened eleven hundred local offices and had 
forty states represented at a national prestrike 
meeting. 
The second direction taken by AAM in its 
organizing after the Springfield rally was 
toward centralization of planning, with part of 
the emphasis going toward a culminating 
protest in Washington that would bring a 
nationwide focus to the organization and the 
strike. Organizers originally believed that 
fragmented local farm interests could result in 
no common purpose. Organizing experiences 
and the development of state units reinforced 
this belief in the need for a strong headquar-
ters role in creating both consensus and 
common activities. 
This leadership role was unlike that of 
traditional farm interest groups with their 
designated organizational hierarchies, special-
ized staff assignments, lobbyist-directed grass 
roots activism, chains of command, and gov-
erning rules.7 From the beginning, AAM 
eschewed membership dues, rolls, officers, and 
any rules. To enhance supporter participation, 
and to more directly contrast AAM with 
general farm and commodity groups criticized 
by the organizers as no longer representative of 
farmers, the movement insisted that anyone 
and everyone could speak on its behalf as long 
as they supported the general ideals of the 
group. 
Within this context, AAM leaders still 
developed a highly centralized organization 
with most responsibilities in the hands of the 
founders. The Springfield headquarters effi-
ciently processed paperwork, monitored as-
signments, kept track of organizers and locals, 
and ensured daily routing operations. In 
addition, a functional-if not formal-division 
of labor emerged within the first days of 
operation. Volunteer staffing, recruitment, 
fund raising, political liaison, economic analy-
sis, public relations, and publications each 
were carefully coordinated by an undesignated 
management team composed mostly of the 
original organizers. 
Building a centralized movement was dif-
ferent from building locals that focused only 
on the strategy of getting people together. 
Because farm interests have remained econom-
ically diverse in terms of region, products, and 
scale of production, headquarters committed 
its efforts toward maintaining supporters' 
involvement and creating an image of unity 
among its followers. 8 Thus, organizers in 
Springfield considered what to tell participat-
ing farmers, what indirect messages were 
needed to encourage nonparticipating farmers, 
how to transmit and reinforce these messages, 
and how to identify inexpensive secondary 
resources. 
Several features came early to characterize 
AAM and distinctively marked its operation. 
The initial emphasis on one hundred percent 
parity developed into AAM's only articulated 
goal. Parity was demanded for all domestically 
used or consumed agricultural products and 
also for all foreign exports. In addition, parity 
was demanded as the basis for all contracting 
of products for national and international 
reserves. Marketing of American agricultural 
products also was to be guaranteed at one 
hundred percent parity, with farmer input in 
the marketing structure. Finally, meat and 
livestock imports were to be banned until 
parity was reached.9 These specific but broad 
agricultural goals enabled all AAM spokesmen 
to direct their public remarks to common 
rather than individual or specific commodity 
interests. Second, in order to explain the 
emphasis on parity and to present further a 
view of integrated farm interests, AAM orga-
nizers drew upon a recurring theme of farm 
protests and reconstructed an agrarian ideolo-
gy reflective of historic demands for "a larger 
share of the market value of " farm products. 1O 
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Leaders argued that the threat of farmer 
activism and a strike would force policymakers 
to act positively because agriculture, especially 
the family farm, was the critical link in the 
national economy. AAM argued that the 
economy could not withstand a farm action 
but that economic conditions for farmers had 
only reached this depressed point because 
most policymakers and the public had been 
kept ignorant of farm needs. Such a situation 
allowed the enemies of family farming to create 
structural conditions that would eventually 
lead to large diversified corporate agriculture. ll 
This argument-as a side benefit-also stressed 
the AAM gospel of hope, that organizing in 
protest and not the proposed strike itself 
would turn the opinions of the public and 
policymakers around. 12 
With this simple set of goals and reinforc-
ing ideology in place, AAM was able to 
construct its remaining strategic features. Con-
tinued cultivation of the media became the 
most important of these. The media was the 
most direct way to let the uninformed public 
and the as yet unactivated farmer become 
aware of AAM's effort. It was also a quick and· 
inexpensive means of communication for a 
group strapped for both time and money. In 
the fall of 1977 and well into 1978, AAM 
leaders had only to keep the media informed of 
planned events to secure coverage whenever 
they wanted. Perceptions of uniqueness 
brought reporters and cameras out from local 
and national sources. Local coverage afforded 
advertising for organizing and protest activ-
ities, enhancing turnout. National coverage 
provided far more, showing AAM and its issue 
of hard times as having gained at least some 
temporary legitimacy since farmers from all 
sections of the country were portrayed as 
commonly bonded in protest. 
The remaining central features were largely 
stylistic. These included the virtually patenta-
ble AAM rally, the rousing speakers, the 
publicity-oriented tractorcade, proliferating 
pamphlets, and continued use of peer pressure 
to generate turnout. All these tactics were 
promoted by headquarters through the state 
organizations and to the locals as the appropri-
ate format for AAM activism. According to 
the leadership, these had maximum shock 
value and added greatly to the national and 
consensual image that they desired. 
As can be seen in almost every newspaper's 
coverage, a standard AAM protest emerged. 
Visible local activity began with Spring-
field-style mass meetings. Experienced organiz-
ers and a few local farmers did most of the 
early talking, hoping to encourage the loudest 
discussion possible from the floor. Then a 
flamboyant or beguiling outside speaker, usual-
ly advertised as a long-time critic of farm or 
business policy, launched into a rather ideolog-
ical diatribeY The rally led to phase two, a 
caravan of tractors and trucks scheduled to 
parade through the business district at a peak 
shopping period. Both the rally and trac-
torcade were accompanied by mass distribu-
tion of relatively short pamphlets on AAM, its 
goals, and ideological justification. A final 
ingredient was the coterie of broad-shouldered 
and heavy-set farmers, strategically placed at 
visible locations. Their purpose was to encour-
age the involvement of others in the ongoing 
activity, to pass attendance sheets, and to 
recruit for future AAM activities. In a more 
general sense, as one organizer acknowledged, 
such a farmer's purpose was "to intimidate, to 
serve as a slightly ominous figure."'4 The 
combined effect was one designed to demon-
strate anger, activism, purposeful resolve, and 
an implied threat of disruption and perhaps 
even violence if cooperation was not forthcom-
ing. AAM used these features of the organiza-
tion to create an image that in turn was used to 
gain the attention necessary for getting its 
message across. 
The image, the need for attention, and the 
belief that the message would eventually work 
all assumed more importance after the strike 
deadline when the passing of legislation, as 
well as the mobilization of farmers, became an 
AAM purpose. AAM organizers had been 
careful to note at the onset that three levels of 
increasingly costly participation were implied 
in their plans: turning out for a rally, working 
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to promote the group and traveling on its 
behalf, and, finally, not planting cropS.IS To 
their credit, they realized that fewer and fewer 
participants would continue their support as 
their costs of involvement escalated. This 
provided AAM resiliency and encouragement 
to continue as its efforts were thwarted in the 
early months of 1978. But this also made it 
difficult for AAM to maintain any long-term 
credibility. 
AAM leaders soon became discouraged on 
two fronts: in Washington, where their legis-
lative goals were long debated but finally 
failed, and in rural America, where all but a 
handful of fields were planted during the 
strike. In Washington, AAM's largest rally on 
18 January turned out nearly three thousand 
farmers and brought a long tractorcade into 
town on the interstates. Official Washington 
opened up its arms as these farmer lobbyists 
spoke of the more than three million who had 
attended AAM rallies. 16 Secretary Bergland 
received AAM's statement of demands en-
route in Omaha, and every congressional 
office was filled with courteous but angry 
protestors attempting to explain their position. 
Many of these farmers, perhaps a third, stayed 
throughout the spring as Congress found its 
house hoppers filled with AAM inspired 
proposals. Another hundred or so made plans 
to stay or to arrange periodic returns through 
the year to help support this seeming cornuco-
pia of Washingtonian goodwill. As one of 
these participants remarked enthusiastically, 
"They poured out of every corner to meet with 
us-when I sawall that, I knew we were 
damned important." A fellow protest leader 
said, "We thought we owned the damned 
town, we knew it, by God. We knew we did."17 
From January through April, these impres-
sions seemed accurate. In addition to introduc-
ing the legislative proposals, the House of 
Representatives in February held Agriculture 
subcommittee hearings and, for two weeks, 
included AAM. Congress, over the next few 
months, continued to deliberate and eventual-
ly went on to pass a new farm loan program 
and to call a moratorium on all Farmers Home 
Administration foreclosures. Both actions oc-
curred in a year when no major items were on 
the agricultural agenda. Even more visible to 
the protestors, however, were the twenty or 
more legislators who left Washington and 
returned to their districts to ride in the 
unabating local tractorcades. But the triumph 
was short-lived as symbolic acts of support 
gave way to political realities. 
The greatest frustration for the amateur 
lobbyists of AAM resulted from their greatest 
legislative achievement. IS At the height of this 
Washington protest, Senator Robert Dole 
(R-Kansas) sponsored and, through the inter-
vention of Senate Agriculture Committee 
Chairman Herman Talmadge (D-Georgia) in 
amending a House-passed raisin marketing 
order, secured Senate passage of a flexible 
parity plan (H.R. 6782) that was geared to 
AAM's demands. 19 All indications, according 
to AAM leaders, were that the amendment 
had strong support in the House of Represen-
tatives, as well. Their feeling-and one express-
ed often by Washingtonians at that time-was 
that Congress could hardly turn them down 
with the proposal so far advanced and the 
protest at its peak. However, President Carter 
and his administration worked hard to defeat 
the bill on both budgetary grounds and the 
issue of food price inflation. Consequently, a 
House-Senate conference committee version 
failed to secure House passage. That bill 
subsequently went back to conference and the 
Emergency Assistance Act of 1978 was re-
reported as a very different measure, an 
authorization for price support readjustments 
at USDA Secretary Bergland's discretion. The 
readjustment measure passed both houses, was 
signed by the president on 15 May, and led to 
an approximate eleven percent increase in 
supports. Although the measure would not 
have been considered in the absence of AAM's 
new prominence, organization leaders took it 
as a congressional sellout and an example of 
presidential backstabbing. Rather than view it 
as a product of political compromise nego-
tiated between many bargainers, the leaders 
"knew we were sold out. It was a setup from 
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day one!"20 
The strike, meanwhile, was so financially 
costly for already economically strapped farm-
ers that few could participate. Most of those 
protestors who elected to come to Washington 
went home early to plant or make arrange-
ments to do so. By late winter, protest leaders 
quietly began to call for ten percent produc-
tion cutbacks among the Movement's activists 
as a symbolic show of support. Of the forty--
nine leaders who were asked if they cut back 
production for strike-related reasons in 1979, 
only ten (or twenty percent) responded affir-
matively.2I For AAM followers, the numbers 
surely were far less, as all Economics, Statistics, 
and Cooperative Service documents of the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture showed con-
tinued increased production from 1977 to 
1978. In short, the strike had absolutely no 
effect on food and fiber production. 
AAM leaders were less disturbed with the 
failure of the strike than with the weakened 
emergency farm bill. The strike was explained 
away as an action that everyone wanted to 
avert and that Congress, through its delaying 
action, was able to subvert. Farmers, they 
noted, had to arrange financing and buy 
planting materials far in advance of 15 May. 
Few leaders really expected it to be a successful 
withholding action anyway, it appears. Fewer 
than half of the respondents in the leadership 
survey believed that a strike could succeed if 
organized; and only one-half who felt that it 
could work if organized actually believed that 
it could get underway. These responses seem to 
suggest why the strike and its failure were 
forgotten by AAM as the organization placed 
a renewed emphasis on protest for the remain-
der of 1978. 
AAM efforts did not diminish after the 
flexible parity bill was dismantled in Congress. 
Although what eventually was to be a high 
degree of desertions among both activists and 
rank and file began in the spring of 1978, 
AAM's levels of activity and visibility re-
mained high. The leaders and their remaining 
supporters continued and accelerated past 
tactics. They emphasized the development of 
plans for a larger national protest, expanded 
local organizations and protest, and exerted 
more national influence on organizational 
events. 
Alternatives were only briefly considered 
for two reasons. Most leaders sincerely be-
lieved that AAM had almost succeeded legis-
latively solely by focusing so much public and 
political attention on itself. AAM activists 
continuously spoke of the leader who voiced 
the opinion that "the squeaking wheel gets the 
grease."22 Blacks and university students were 
pointed to as examples of those who had 
succeeded in this way. Politics as a more subtle 
process of negotiation and compromise was 
not defined in the AAM dictionary. As a 
result, those who remained with AAM were 
angry and frustrated with Washington poli-
ticians and agreed with the leader who said, 
"Next time, more of the same. More and 
better." They believed it when they said, "We 
can shut Washington down."23 
The other reason for not deviating from 
AAM's ongoing strategy was simply that of 
sunk costs, in the phrase favored by econo-
mists. Those responsible for AAM had in-
vested their available resources in order to 
organize a Colorado office, state organizations, 
locals, and a protest style. With its meager 
financial base and dependence upon volun-
teers, AAM could not afford to reverse itself 
and invest in new offices and tactics. In 
addition, supporters of AAM had their own 
sunk costs relative to their involvement in the 
rhetoric and unyielding demands of the 
Movement. Any attempt to change directions 
could potentially cost AAM its hardest-
working followers. 
As a result, AAM changed mostly by 
degrees during the second half of 1978. Head-
quarters stepped up communications with the 
states and locals. The highly critical American 
Agriculture News was regularly published and 
distributed. And, at least partially because of 
these messages, the ideology of AAM became 
more sharply focused and evident. It no longer 
extolled agrarian values. The anger of early 
1978 was directed at the previously chastened 
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corporations; banking interests and interna-
tionalists were added to the list of enemies now 
portrayed as the primary reason for AAM's 
legislative defeat. 
The second Washington tractorcade, oc-
curring in January 1979, must be understood 
in the context of escalating anger, more 
extreme interpretations of economic condi-
tions, and the increasing difficulty of gaining 
media attention. More moderate farmers, 
including many from the earliest stages of 
AAM protest, continued to leave the ranks as 
charges became more harsh and less politically 
acceptable to them. This desertion produced a 
longer tractorcade of nearly nine hundred 
vehicles but an actual turnout of only half as 
many farmers, although their ranks did grow. 
It also produced a group without many of the 
calming voices that earlier had urged temper-
ate behavior. The second tractorcade, unlike 
the first, refused to park peacefully at a local 
stadium upon its arrival. Protestors immedi-
ately and frequently tied up traffic, blocked 
intersections, and damaged federal facilities. 
Finally, the police successfully confined them 
to the Mall. 
This time Washington did not open its 
doors. AAM found most legislators unavail-
able except for the briefest discussions. No 
ranking administration officials made protes-
tors feel at home. In retaliation, many farmers 
became belligerent and threatening, which 
further isolated them from their targets. By 
midwinter, with most television networks and 
newspapers criticizing their personal behavior 
and ignoring their political complaints, most 
AAM protestors left town despite their earlier 
threats to stay until spring. 
This disastrous turn in AAM's public 
relations marked a dramatic shift in organiza-
tional behavior. AAM was, by February 1979, 
everyone's subject of criticism; and it had lost 
even more supporters from its own ranks. Its 
behavior was labeled a disgrace by the media, 
Congress, USDA, other agricultural groups, 
consumer groups, and many who had helped 
found it. Despite whatever sunk costs re-
mained among the closing locals and disap-
pearing state organizations, the group had no 
option other than a sharp change in political 
tactics. 
The rest of 1979 was devoted to keeping 
AAM afloat. Although some local and state 
protests continued, the few remaining diehards 
could not generate support for a return to 
Washington and a third protest tractorcade 
died in planning. During this period, all locals 
in twelve states were closed. In the remaining 
twenty-eight, delegates at the June 1979 AAM 
convention estimated that between sixty and 
ninety percent of their state locals were totally 
inactive. AAM was most evident through its 
News. 
AAM kept functioning by keeping like-
minded farmers informed and by invoking 
memories of how smoothly the organizational 
aspects of the strike had come together. A 
small Washington office with a single paid 
lobbyist was established. The protestors who 
remained in Washington or returned through-
out 1979 worked to develop an image of 
continuous political involvement. They coor-
dinated their activities through that office and 
attempted to work with as many congressional 
staffs and USDA bureaus as possible. As part 
of that new strategy, the tractorcade scheduled 
for February 1980 was replaced by a series of 
informational demonstrations, including sev-
eral distilleries for producing gasohol, which 
was proposed as a solution to the nation's 
energy problems. These activists assumed more 
of the informational role that political scien-
tists have observed to be typical of lobbies, 
although they did arouse some threats by 
emphasizing that AAM would become active 
elector ally in the future. z4 
Within the organization, support and turn-
out continued to lag. The June convention 
had been seen as a time and place for 
formalizing the organization. The leadership 
presented a plan that they hoped would lend 
even greater structure to AAM while strength-
ening the commitment and support of its very 
fluid membership. The delegates found propos-
als for formal membership, dues, a strength-
ened Washington office, and bylaws 
228 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, FALL 1985 
unacceptable because such innovations were 
ill-timed and inappropriate while AAM lacked 
an existing base of support. The delegates 
approved a loose organizational structure that 
designated formal leaders-a national chair, 
vice chair, secretary, and treasurer-to foster 
growth and purpose for the Movement. This 
action also passed on a governing national 
body of the designated state delegates whose 
status had been approved a year earlier. 
The second 1979 convention in November 
elected Marvin Meek, a cotton farmer from 
the Texas panhandle and an early AAM 
activist, as AAM's first chair. At this point, 
AAM also possessed twenty-eight state dele-
gations, parity as its political goal, a still 
organized headquarters, a small Washington 
office, a few thousand subscribers to American 
Agricultural News, and an almost completely 
inactive system of locals. It had emerged to 
strike, had wielded a formidable and well-or-
ganized protest, and had lost momentum as its 
protest met with public disfavor. The remain-
ing leadership sought to continue as a viable 
farm interest and voice by regaining that 
momentum. Although AAM went on to stage 
some protests, its leaders never captured what 
they lost despite vigorous campaign work, 
attempts to take control of other farm groups, 
and continued national lobbying. 25 
AAM IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Much about this surge and decline in the 
organizational fortunes. of AAM parallels the 
history of earlier American farm groups. Two 
political scientists who have formulated con-
temporary theories of interest groups provide 
some generalized insights into what links 
AAM to the past. Robert H. Salisbury, who in 
fact developed many of his ideas from obser-
vations about agricultural groups, discusses 
interest groups in terms of entrepreneurs and 
the creation of membership benefits.26 Entre-
preneurs are organizational founders who 
build a group structure and then generate a 
following. That following commits itself to 
some form of low- to high-cost group mem-
bership in exchange for specific benefits offered 
by the entrepreneurs. These benefits may be of 
many different types, but all are important in 
that they can be gained only· through group 
participation. 
Jack L. Walker, on the other hand, finds 
that new groups can hardly be successful 
without what he identifies as their patrons of 
political action. 27 If the patrons-who may be 
some form of mass membership-are in no 
mood or position to support the group, no 
amount of entrepreneurship will succeed. For 
this reason, new interest groups are most likely 
to emerge in times of social upheaval, when an 
investment in a particular group seems most 
worthwhile. 28 
For agricultural protest groups with a 
general interest in farm conditions rather than 
in specific product or commodity gains, this 
conceptual framework specifies several factors 
generally important to group emergence.29 
These groups usually are organized during 
periods when farm prices are comparatively 
low. Thus, farmers perceive an upheaval 
relative to their own prior situations. In times 
such as these, entrepreneurs who have been 
active in the farm community become the 
major catalyst for organizing by selling discon-
tented farmer patrons on the need for group 
action. The ongoing political order, but partic-
ularly institutions that directly gain from the 
farm economy, becomes identified as not only 
the cause of farm problems but also as the 
source of solutions. Although some organiza-
tions seek to address these problems through 
cooperative purchasing and sales arrangements 
and others do so by emphasizing strong social 
ties among themselves, all share some sort of a 
protest orientation directed toward a positive 
political reaction. That is, they all want 
material rewards for their members and pursue 
them through strategies that separate the 
groups from the political mainstream. Further-
more, each organization or movement devel-
ops or acquires a supportive ideology to 
differentiate their version of a stronger agrari-
an lifestyle from that of the rest of society. It 
seems true, as Don Hadwiger once observed of 
farmers in politics, that these organizations 
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emerge in crusades of dramatic change because 
their members do not feel part of the political 
system, being so far removed from the centers 
of politics and the stimuli produced there. 30 
The American Agriculture Movement 
emerged in reaction to a farm policy that, 
through the 1973 farm bill, had created 
fencerow-to-fencerow production following a 
period of high farm prices. Policymakers had 
hoped to encourage production in order to tap 
international markets-which, unfortunately, 
proved to be unstable and did not continue to 
expand with U.S. farm efforts. Thus, as supply 
increased, demand decreased and prices 
dragged. The importance of this price decline 
was exaggerated because inflation in the gener-
al economy was pushing up both annual costs 
of production and interest rates. For some 
farmers, increasing interest rates were unusual-
ly troublesome because of recent land and 
equipment purchases they had made to step up 
personal production. When no corrective 
action was proposed as part of the 1978 farm 
bill, farmers were indeed left at an extremely 
low economic point. 31 
Similar conditions plagued the earliest farm 
organizers and inspired their protests. The 
earliest large-scale farm organization, the 
Grange, began in 1870 during a period of U.S. 
agricultural expansion at the conclusion of the 
Civil War. High war prices gave way in the 
face of production increases and by 1878, as 
the Grange grew, corn prices had steadily 
declined thirty-two percent from 1866. This 
period also spawned agrarian participation in 
the Greenback Party and the Free Silver 
movement after they had spread from urban 
centers. As they would be in 1978, agrarian 
protestors were disenchanted by federal legis-
lation in 1878, when the touted Bland-Allison 
Act failed to appreciably expand the money 
supply despite the coinage of silverY 
FIG. 1. Tractors at Capitol after tractorcade 5 February 1979, about 2 PM, while police were busy 
boxing them in and farmers were listening to speeches and unaware of what was happening. The sign. 
on the left hand side of the right foreground tractor reads "DOGING IT TO WASHINGTON," 
while the sign on back reads "With Prices and Tails Cut WE ARE STILL WAGGING." Photo by 
J. Fetterolf, courtesy of American Agriculturist. 
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The National Farmers Alliance (NFA) 
emerged out of these conditions as well. Its 
base, however, was the yeoman farmer of the 
South who, more than his northern neigh-
bors, lived in economic, political, and social 
dependency. The average farmer relied on 
credit to finance future crops. Eventually, 
because of continuing low prices, many south-
ern farmers were so deeply in debt that they 
lacked hope for ever being cleared. The Texas 
Alliance, Louisiana Farmers' Union, and 
Agricultural Wheel-the three arms of NFA's 
1888 merger-all originated in that context. 33 
The early twentieth century saw three new 
farm organizations develop: the National 
Farmers Union (NFU) and American Society 
of Equity in 1902 and the Nonpartisan League 
in 1914. The NFU was built on the ruins of the 
Alliance in Texas while Equity began in 
Indiana. Farmers in neither movement faced 
historically low prices during this period of 
relatively sustained agricultural prosperity.34 
They, however, still experienced at least minor 
swings in the market place and remembered 
the major ones. Organizational momentum 
was provided by fear of lower cotton prices for 
the NFU and, in the case of Equity, by an 
avoidance of what farmers saw as continuing 
violent price fluctuations. The League, with its 
North Dakota origins, began after a dry season 
combined with lower prices to drive some 
farmers out of business. Arthur C. Townley, 
the founder of the Nonpartisans, had expand-
ed during the good years of 1910-1911 and was 
financially vulnerable to severe losses for 
which he would not take blame as profits 
dropped in 1912.35 The Farmers Holiday 
Association was the only major protest group 
spawned during the Great Depression and it 
was largely ad hoc in nature. 36 
The last general agrarian protest prior to 
AAM's emergence was in 1955 as prices fell 
after the Korean War. The National Farmers 
Organization (NFO) , also Iowa-based, em-
phasized collective bargaining during a period 
that saw a ten-year decline in the price index of 
eleven percent, accompanied by a seventeen 
percent increase in the costs. of services and 
goods for farmers. 37 They had more success 
than all farm organizations but the Grange 
and NFU in developing a lasting organization. 
But the routes to success and failure were 
similarly tumultuous for each of these organi-
zations. 
Entrepreneurship characterized these 
groups just as it did AAM. Without what 
Saloutos and Hicks identified as "gifted farm 
organizers," many of them never would have 
existed.38 In other instances, entrepreneurs 
were only interested in their own initial 
groups. Oliver Hudson Kelley of the Grange 
and the NFU's Newton Gresham left govern-
ment and newspaper careers to organize while 
living off credit and neighborly largess. Milo 
Reno, a preacher and NFU worker, coordi-
nated and symbolized the Farmers Holiday 
protests. Arthur C. Townley, a professional 
organizer with a history of work in radical 
causes, organized the Nonpartisan League 
using "high pressure salesmanship." Although 
these and most other dominant leaders worked 
with activists who also played important roles 
in organizing, Equity was totally centered in 
the hands of publisher James A. Everitt. The 
NFO originated in a similar fashion with Iowa 
feed salesman Jay Loghry but was taken over 
by the charismatic Oren Lee Staley. The 
Farmers Alliance with its merger of groups 
owed its organizational successes to a greater 
variety of individuals, but the Texas Alliance's 
John R. Allen and A. P. Hungate had great 
influence, as did professional activists Charles 
Macune and S. O. Daws after the union.39 
Within AAM, farmers Darrel Schroeder and 
Bud Bitner and elevator operator Van Stafford 
were particularly and continuously influential 
in articulating the purpose of the protests. 
Marvin Meeks's firelike commitment, tremen-
dous dedication to work, and skills at devel-
oping strategy won him an early position in 
the group's small leadership cadre. 
The roles of the entrepreneur in each of 
these instances must be understood as critical 
to the group's emergence. The fact that 
economic times have often been difficult for 
farmers, yet protests and groups did not come 
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together, demonstrates the organizer's impor-
tance as a catalyst. Given the potential for new 
groups to emerge, there have been surprisingly 
few. As Kohl has so succinctly stated, "Farm-
ers do not rebel as an instinctive response."40 
The social benefits of agrarian fraternity 
and just plain friendship facilitated many of 
the organizational attempts, including AAM's; 
and solidarity benefits have certainly been 
important for group maintenance, especially 
for the Grange. But it must be noted that each 
group sought political satisfaction for their 
members' problems during these particularly 
bad economic times. 
The growth years of the Grange began in 
1872-73 as Kelley focused on securing cheaper 
transportation from what farmers perceived as 
repressive railroads.41 Interestingly, the Grange 
grew most rapidly during that period in 
regions of greatest economic distress. The 
Alliance also was most successful when most 
politicized. They used the "too slow" Grange 
as a foil to claim that the Alliance was more 
militant, cooperative, and successful. When 
NFU came forward from the ranks of the 
defunct Alliance, it did so as an anticapitalist 
effort to build counter institutions for market-
ing cotton. NFU aimed to succeed by holding 
cotton off the market. Equity, at the same time 
but under the guidance of an entrepreneur 
with free market rather than socialist values, 
was also organizing to withhold. Everitt, 
however, wanted farmers to emulate big trusts 
and gain control of the market through such 
an actionY 
The Nonpartisan League was the most 
overtly political of the farm groups, aiming to 
take over state government and elect a per-
centage of representatives equal to a state's 
percentage of farmers. By 1918, they had 
captured the governorship and control of both 
legislative houses in North Dakota. Despite 
these successes and the permanence of Minne-
sota's Democratic Farm-Labor Party, the diffi-
culties of maintaining an electoral coalition 
proved disadvantageous to the League's exis-
tence. Both the Farm Bureau and Farmers 
Union drew away its membership base in the 
early 1920s with their emphasis on mem-
bership services.43 During economic good 
times, politics appeared too time-consuming 
for busy farmers. At least that was the lesson 
farm organizers seemed to learn because the 
Farm Holiday, NFO, and AAM all mobilized 
later around threats of withholding and collec-
tive action. The lack of interest in permanent 
political control by farm movement organizers 
should not be surprising. Farming has always 
been an all-encompassing enterprise and, as 
AAM's attempt indicates, most of its practi-
tioners have neither the time nor inclination 
to become deeply enmeshed in governmental 
activity. As a result, farmers can be organized 
around a plan or an idea, but their continued 
commitment is unlikely. 
The Grange began a decline by 1875. The 
Alliance was dead by the turn of the century. 
Equity's protest activity lasted eight years. The 
Farmers Holiday Association went into eclipse 
in four. The strike activity ofNFO was evident 
sporadically over a period of years and then 
peaked in 1962. Even the NFU, which survives 
with the greatest degree of political presence 
and largest membership of any general farm 
group except the Farm Bureau, put member 
activism aside and by 1910 had settled into 
organizational routines of cooperative, social, 
and educational activities.44 
Entrepreneurs, in order to organize success-
fully, must know their markets, or what 
appeals to potential patrons. The history of 
farm group organizing indicates that farmers 
find appealing the quick fix with its emphasis 
on dramatic protest and a comforting ideolo-
gy. Protests, as visible demonstrations against 
those who are seen responsible for the farmers' 
plight, have been characteristic of these 
groups. AAM indiscretions during these ac-
tions seem remarkably tame and free of 
violence compared to those of many preceed-
ing groups. 
Tobacco farmers associated with Equity 
used night riders who set fires, sabotaged the 
tobacco trust, and dynamited its machinery. 
NFU night riders also served as enforcers, in 
this case attempting to insure participation in 
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the 1908 "plow up" campaign. The Farmers 
Holiday directed violence at nonparticipating 
farmers and blocked roads to disrupt market-
ing. NFO withholding was accompanied by 
shootings. Even the recurrent counter market-
ing institutions were primarily protests against 
dominant middleman interests and those in 
politics who countenanced themY In all these 
instances, farm groups viewed protests as 
instrumental to obtaining capitulation and 
cooperation from those who opposed their 
interests. As political outsiders without bar-
gaining power, they used the protest to dem-
onstrate farm power to the targets and, to at 
least some degree, to the subjects who were 
being recruited and mobilized. American farm-
ers always appear to have needed a forceful 
and reassuring display of their own ability to 
matter. They have had little time for anything 
else. 
Farmers, however, have needed more in 
order to be reassured. Consistently, ideology 
has been used to reach farm supporters and 
back up displays of force. AAM's rhetoric 
glorified the family farm, agrarian virtues, and 
the economic contribution of agriculturalists 
as producers and consumers. It also criticized 
politics, farm groups, and the public for being 
inattentive to farm needs and, thus, responsi-
ble for low farm prices.46 In 1977 and through 
mid-I978 this justified AAM's strategy, but as 
AAM demands were turned away in 1978 and 
as attacks on the organization and its political 
style intensified in 1979, group leaders devel-
oped the enemies of agriculture argument 
much further. A hard and fast ideology-or 
perhaps a second-stage ideology-developed 
quickly. High costs, which had always been 
advanced as a reason for increasing prices, 
were blamed on a corporate conspiracy rather 
than on the conditions of the economy Y The 
"corporates" increasingly were portrayed as 
having ruined that economy through their 
monopolistic handling of agricultural prod-
ucts. They did so in league with bankers and 
other international interests who, as "master 
swindlers," controlled all facets of society 
including agricultural and economic research 
that might otherwise have proposed solutions. 
Moreover, these enemies created a moral crisis 
in the nation by advancing their interests 
through welfare economics, propaganda, and 
the victimization of all working Americans.48 
While this broad set of beliefs might not 
have been entirely accepted by AAM's sup-
porters, and indeed was not generally accepted 
by its activists, it was important nonetheless.49 
With it, during mobilization, AAM possessed 
a general explanation for its existence and 
protest strategy. As losses mounted, the ideol-
ogy hardened and was used to encourage the 
hardliners who still fought for AAM's exis-
tence. 
Ideology has been similarly useful for other 
farm groups, and there is certainly very little 
new about AAM's rhetoric. The idealization 
of farm life and its contrasts to the rest of 
society were integral to populism, the Grange, 
groups of the Alliance, NFU, the Farmers 
Holiday, and NFO. The Free Silver and 
Greenback movements and the Nonpartisan 
League provided economic arguments compat-
ible with AAM's fears of farmer repression. 
The Alliance, NFU, Farmers Holiday, NFO, 
and to some extent Equity all mounted attacks 
on the monopolies that were seen as victimiz-
ing farmers. Even the rhetoric of Granger 
attacks on the railroads and calls for cooper-
atives were similar. Moreover, most of these 
groups shifted, like AAM, from agrarian 
idealism to more radical criticism. As the 
organizations began to decline and lose sup-
porters, ideologies became more pronounced 
and more critical of the institutions that 
farmers depended upon-an example of the 
way ideology traditionally has been used for 
entrepreneurial purposes in structuring farm 
protests against low prices. 
FARM PROTEST IN A MODERN SOCIETY 
If the American Agriculture Movement has 
been much like its predecessors in farm politics, 
it has also benefited and suffered as a result of 
conditions found only in modern society and its 
technology. The electronic media most impor-
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tantly, modern transportation, and other inno-
vations in communications made AAM possible 
as a rapidly emerging national protest group. 
These had been unavailable even twenty-three 
years earlier to the NFO, although that organi-
zation did gain extensive midwest newspaper 
coverage. 
The technology and-AAM's skillful use of it 
allowed the organization to develop a national 
image, reputation, and support group that no 
other farm protest group had ever possessed. At 
the onset, local protestors brought in farmers 
from other states and regions. When organizing 
locals, AAM emphasized their broad disperse-
ment and sent. its own leadership around the 
county as facilitators. By becoming a nationally 
recognized interest and moving its protest to the 
midst of political decision-making in Washing-
ton, AAM developed its bargaining power as 
politicians countrywide sought out its 
spokesmen. AAM also established an ongoing 
communications system linking its headquarters 
with the locals. Telephones, printing operations, 
and rapid mail delivery enabled messages to be 
disseminated quickly and on a large scale. This 
resulted in well-coordinated rallies and allowed 
the organizers to continue to prod reluctant 
locals. As a result, AAM's grass roots involve-
ment was most impressive and added futher to 
its credibility. 
AAM's most important decision, however, 
was to rely on the media, especially television, to 
advertise its activities. AAM was able to reach 
all potential targets: the public, politicians, and 
likely farm supporters. To gain that coverage, 
AAM was creative' enough to emphasize its 
flamboyance. Releasing goats on the Capitol 
grounds, harrassing a West German consul, 
throwing tomatoes at Secretary Bergland, and 
similar incidents all became important for their 
news appeal. As Marvin Meek was quoted as 
saying, "We may be stupid but at least we're 
smart enough not to buy TV time."so The 
media's coverage was the cornerstone of the 
American Agricultural Movement. Without it, 
AAM could not have spread its message of hard 
times, protest, and the value of farming so 
quickly or so efficiently. The national uprising 
caught everyone but AAM's own activists off-
guard and created a look of spontaneity that few 
interest groups have had. In addition, AAM 
initially possessed few financial or manpower 
resources and could hardly have organized in 
any other way. 
Although modern technology and AAM's 
brand of marketing served the organization well 
during its emergence, it also became a negative 
factor. News representatives were less eager to 
get involved as AAM events became routine. 
This led to a continued escalation of the 
protests. Combined with the anger and frustra-
tion accompanying the second Washington 
tractorcade, this escalation proved a disaster. 
Media coverage and public opinion became 
especially critical of AAM, and a positive image 
proved to be impossible to recreate. As a result, 
by the time AAM became most critical of 
political and economic events, there was no one 
left to report or to listen. 
The American Agriculture Movement 
played a short but central role in the politics of 
U.S. agriculture. It did so by behaving much like 
those few other protest groups who have 
appeared locally over the past 110 years. But its 
organizational successes were very different from 
those of preceding groups because of AAM's 
ability to achieve a national following. The use 
of modern technology allowed AAM to reach 
both farmers and the public to a truly extraordi-
nary degree, but the organization's mobilization 
did little to ensure its future. In this respect, 
AAM suffers the fate of those various other farm 
organizations that have either died or gone 
through periods of very poor health. 
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